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In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as the UK's leader, he was the fifth British prime minister to take up the role over a six-year span.

Triggered in the UK by Brexit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is occurring in France, now on its fifth premier in 24 months – three of them in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s key pension reform in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the price for his administration's continuation.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is locked in a ongoing governmental crisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for many years – possibly not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there appears no easy escape.

Minority Rule

Key background: from the moment Macron called an ill-advised snap general election in 2024, France has had a divided assembly separated into three opposing factions – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the country faces dual debt and deficit crises: its debt-to-GDP ratio and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

Against that unforgiving backdrop, both the prime ministers before Lecornu – Michel Barnier, who served from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who held the position from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the leader named his trusted associate Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu presented his government team – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from allies and opponents alike.

To such an extent that the next day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the shortest-lived premier in recent French history. In a respectful address, he cited political rigidity, saying “party loyalties” and “personal ambitions” would make his job virtually unworkable.

A further unexpected development: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for two more days in a final attempt to secure multi-party support – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two ex-prime ministers openly criticized the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and radical left France Unbowed (LFI) refused to meet Lecornu, promising to vote down any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu persisted in his duties, engaging with all willing listeners. At the conclusion of his extension, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to avoid elections. The president’s office announced the president would name a fresh premier two days later.

Macron honored his word – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron commenting from the wings that the country’s rival political parties were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who detest Macron’s unpopular pension overhaul, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would not back censorship votes proposed against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, due on Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS clearly stated that it would be demanding further compromises. “This move,” said its head, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

Changing Political Culture

The problem is, the greater concessions he makes to the left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, like the PS, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – certain members remain eager to bring it down.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how tough Lecornu’s task – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth precarious prime minister in two years is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Most expect this to occur soon. Although, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to approve a budget this year, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So does an exit exist? Snap elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would see reduced representation, but there would remain no decisive majority. A fresh premier would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the ensuing legislative vote. But that, too, is uncertain.

Polls suggest the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that decisive majorities are a bygone phenomenon, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be possible under the country’s current constitution. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will endure indefinitely.

“The system wasn't built to encourage – and actively discourages – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”